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Abstract
In a two-period model with agent heterogeneity we analyze a pension
reform toward a stronger link between contributions and beneﬁts (as recently
observed in several countries) in a pension system with a Bismarckian and
a Beveridgian component. We show that such a policy change reduces the
educational level in an economy. The life expectancy diﬀerential between
skilled and unskilled individuals drives this result. Furthermore, we investi-
gate the consequences on the intragenerational redistribution characteristics
of the pension system – in the sense of the number of net-recipients relative
to net-payers – as well as welfare eﬀects.
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This paper studies the eﬀects of a pension reform toward a stronger link between
individual contributions and beneﬁts on the educational level of the economy. In
particular, we are interested in the consequences of the interplay of diﬀerent types
of redistribution when a (public) pension system becomes more ‘Bismarckian’, a
direction into which many countries headed since the 1990s. In a two-period model
with agent heterogeneity we argue that a pension reform of the described type dis-
courages human capital investment at the margin. Furthermore, we show that the
reform will change the ratio of net-payers to net-recipients of the pension system.
Governments considering a pension reform should therefore keep in mind that (ex-
ogenously) given life expectancy and productivity diﬀerences between skilled and
unskilled individuals may induce an undesired outcome.
It is widely accepted that output is the key variable for solving the demographic
challenge in the Western world (see Barr 2004, p. 207). According to standard growth
theory human capital accumulation, i.e. education in a broader sense, leads to a
higher growth path and thus to more output. When more output is available due
to higher education-induced growth, shifting resources from young to old becomes
easier in ageing societies, regardless of whether their pension systems are pay-as-you-
go (PAYG) or funded. However, not only may education have an impact on pension
systems but also the design of pension systems on human capital accumulation and
therefore growth.
When individuals maximize their lifetime utility, they will take redistributive
taxation via the pension system into account. PAYG pension systems introduce an
implicit tax on income (see e.g. Sinn, 2000). While this tax inevitably follows from
intergenerational redistribution (from young to old), tax rates diﬀer depending on
the level of intragenerational redistribution between individuals of the same gener-
ation (usually from rich to poor). Following the convention by Cremer and Pestieau
(1998), a pension system with zero or little intragenerational redistribution may be
called ‘Bismarckian’ while a system with ﬂat-rate beneﬁts is called ‘Beverdigian’,
assuming that in both systems contributions are collected by means of a payroll tax.
The more Beverdigian a pension system is, the higher is implicit taxation (Sinn,
2000). Hence, activities creating additional income will become less attractive under
these circumstances. Since education is positively correlated with income, a pension
1system with a high level of Beveridgian redistribution may discourage human capital
investment (see Lau and Poutvaara, 2000).
However, in our analysis – unlike most of the existing literature – we consider that
there exist not only one, but two intragenerationally redistributive channels within
a pension system which could inﬂuence the incentive to invest in human capital.
The ﬁrst channel is the previously mentioned, ‘traditional’ intragenerational rich-to-
poor redistribution. It follows from the fact that rich persons contribute relatively
more than poor persons, but receive (almost) the same beneﬁt under a Beveridgian
system. Only under a pure Bismarckian system no intragenerational redistribution
takes place. As in Cremer and Pestieau (1998) we use the so called ‘Bismarckian
factor’ to describe a mixture of Bismarckian and Beveridgian elements when pension
beneﬁts are calculated. The higher the Bismarckian factor, i.e. the tighter the link
between one’s contributions and one’s own beneﬁts, the more attractive is a pension
system for a high income earner. However, this rich-to-poor redistribution is softened
by a poor-to-rich redistributive eﬀect when higher incomes correlate with higher
life expectancy (Borck, 2005). If high income earners receive pension beneﬁts for a
longer time than low income earners, this potentially leads to redistribution from
the poor to the rich when the eﬀect is suﬃciently strong to compensate for lower
absolute contributions. This, however, is true only when at least some Beveridgian
redistribution takes place.1
In the literature, the distinction between Beveridgian and Bismarckian pension
systems has attracted some attention. Some of the literature asks whether there is a
negative relation between the level of intragenerational redistribution and the size of
PAYG pension systems (see, e.g. Casamatta, Cremer and Pestieau, 2000a; K¨ othen-
b¨ urger, Poutvaara and Profeta, 2005). Other models explain why real world pension
systems usually contain both Beveridgian and Bismarckian elements (Conde-Ruiz
and Profeta, 2005; Casamatta, Cremer and Pestieau, 2000b; Cremer and Pestieau,
1998, 2003; Kolmar, 2005).2
A further strand of the literature which is closely connected to our analysis dis-
1Bommier, Leroux and Lozachmeur (2005a, 2005b) discuss a social planner’s problem who would
like to compensate individuals for diﬀerent life expectancies, given the existence of a pension system.
2Further topics related to Beveridgian and Bismackian pension systems include migration issues
(Krieger, 2003; Rossignol and Taugourdeau, 2006), retirement age (Hougaard Jensen, Lau and
Poutvaara, 2004), unemployment insurance and labor unions (Goerke, 2000).
2cusses the eﬀect of the design of pension systems on the educational decisions of
individuals. Individuals decide whether to invest in (costly) education when they
expect a positive return on their investment. When redistributive taxation of high
incomes via the pension system is suﬃciently strong, individuals may prefer to in-
vest less into their human capital. This argument can be found in Lau and Pout-
vaara (2000, 2001) and Poutvaara (2005). However, this literature ignores the life
expectancy channel.
Finally, it is important to note that our analysis of the eﬀects of a pension reform
on an economy’s educational level is based on the observation that recent pension
reforms in European countries share two common characteristics: we observe a trend
toward higher funding and toward a stronger link between individual contributions
and pension beneﬁts, as shown by Werding (2003) or Fenge et al. (2003) for OECD
countries since the 1990s. More funding means less intergenerational redistribution
in the ﬁrst place, while a stronger link between individual contributions and pen-
sion beneﬁts reduces intragenerational redistribution in the pension system. We do
not consider policy changes toward more funded systems but focus on the second
phenomenon and analyze how such a policy reform aﬀects the level of education in
an economy.
Based on the previous discussion, our model then analyzes the eﬀect of a change
in the pension system on the educational level in an economy and considers – thereby
closing a gap in the literature – in particular a positive correlation between individ-
ual education and longevity. Intuitively, there are good reasons to believe that life
expectancy depends on the educational background of an individual. The fact that
skilled people usually face a more stable social situation, have higher incomes and
have a way of living which more agrees with health compared to unskilled people,3
justiﬁes this. Furthermore, Bopp and Minder (2003) for example found substantial
mortality gradients by education in German speaking Switzerland in the 1990s for
ages between 25 and 90 in a longitudinal data set of the Swiss National Cohort.
While – at a ﬁrst glance – it may seem a little far-reaching to assume, for instance,
a 20-years old person seriously considering educational eﬀects on retirement income,
there are at least two arguments in support of this. First, according to Sinn (2005),
3See for example the German Health Report 2006 of the Robert Koch Institute or Schneider and
Schneider (2006) who ﬁnd empirical evidence for Germany that“education is a central determinant
of health relevant behavior”.
3behavioral changes take place as a reaction to changes in social systems, however,
they often take a long time to become widely anticipated. For instance, by the
way of observation and imitation, generation after generation adapted to the new
institutional circumstances after the ﬁrst introduction of public pension systems,
until ﬁnally, fertility rates slumped to today’s historically low levels. Therefore, when
a pension reform takes place today people will not immediately start to invest more
or less into their human capital. Some years or decades from now, however, it may
be a common wisdom that ‘you have to go to university in order to be able to
ﬁnance retirement’. A second argument follows from the observation that changes of
subjective variables may suﬃce to induce certain behavioral changes. In our model,
we argue that life expectancy diﬀerences play an important role when it comes
to educational decisions. Psychologists ﬁnd that each additional year of education
increases subjective life expectancy (Mirowsky and Ross, 2000). If individuals also
(ex ante) believe in higher life expectancy due to education and if life expectancy
increases lifetime utility via the pension system, investing into human capital may
appear to be a reasonable strategy, even if – at the end of the day – life expectancy
turns out to be falsely predicted.
The main result of our analysis is that a pension reform toward a more Bis-
marckian pension system reduces the educational level in an economy if individuals
diﬀer in life expectancy at retirement age. Furthermore, we show that the reform not
only changes individual beneﬁts and welfare but may also change the composition
of net-recipients and net-payers in the system, together probably leading to political
consequences in a democracy.
The paper is structured as follows. After introducing the model in Section 2, we
analyze the eﬀects of a pension reform and present our results in Section 3 before
Section 4 brieﬂy discusses the results and concludes.
2 The model
Each individual in our model lives for two periods. While the individual’s time en-
dowment in the ﬁrst period (‘working life’) can be used for either higher education
and supply of skilled labor or exclusively for unskilled work, the second period (‘re-
tirement’) represents the evening of life where individuals no longer work but receive
pension beneﬁts. The individual time endowment in both periods is normalized to
4one.
Whether an individual goes for education or not, to a large extent depends on his
or her ability. We assume heterogenous agents who diﬀer in their ability to acquire
skills in the sense that a more able individual needs less time to do so than a less
able one. h ∈ [0,1] denotes the time fraction in period one needed to acquire skills
(e.g. in form of a university degree) and reﬂects an individual’s ability. While an h
close to zero indicates very high abilities, an h close to one means very low abilities.
Abilities are distributed among individuals according to a cumulative distribution
function F(h) with f(h) representing the corresponding density function.
Each worker’s totally inelastic labor supply is normalized to one. A skilled worker
earns net labor income (1−t)(1−h)w, where w is the wage rate per unit of eﬀective
labor and t ∈ [0,1] is the labor income tax rate or contribution rate to the pension
system. (1 − h) reﬂects working time, i.e. time endowment net of time spent on
education. An unskilled worker is assumed to provide less units of eﬀective labor
per unit of working time compared to a skilled worker. His net income amounts to
qw(1−t), where q ∈]0,1[ reﬂects the diﬀerence in productivity across worker types.
The pension payout for a retiree consists of a ﬂat-rate beneﬁt b and a ﬁrst-period
labor income contingent component α(1 − h)w for skilled and αqw for unskilled
workers, where α ∈ [0,1] is the ‘Bismarckian factor’ (Cremer and Pestieau, 1998).
Individuals receive pension beneﬁts for the time they are alive in the second period.
We assume that skilled pensioners have a life expectancy of one (i.e. they live for the
entire retirement period) while the life expectancy of an unskilled pensioner is only
a fraction (1−σ) of period two with σ ∈ [0,1], i.e. life expectancy is modeled as the
fraction of time in period two before the individual dies. Although we use the term
life expectancy here, there is no uncertainty in our model. Figure 1 summarizes the
time structure of the model. The pension beneﬁts for some skilled individual with
ability h, denoted by Ph, and an unskilled pensioner, denoted by Pq, then can be
written as
Ph = b + α(1 − h)w (1)
Pq = (1 − σ)[b + αqw] (2)
Two extremes of the pension system would be the pure Beveridgian system (b > 0,
α = 0) and the pure Bismarckian system (b = 0, α > 0).
Note that, as our focus is on intragenerational redistribution, we use a simpliﬁed
5Figure 1: Time structure
framework which in principle considers overlapping generations. We assume, how-
ever, that each generation reproduces itself exactly. The pension beneﬁts should in
fact be denoted by (1 + n)Ph and (1 + n)Pq, where n reﬂects the return on contri-
butions to the PAYG system.4 For simplicity, we assume n = 0 which will, however,
not change our results qualitatively. Another standard assumption is that ability is
inherited. Furthermore, contribution rates are ﬁxed and decision making lasts for
individual lifetime. This allows us to consider only one generation at each point
in time. This is because all generations are identical with respect to size and skill
distribution.
The individual when deciding on education – the education decision is a 0-1-
decision – considers his abilities, the net pension beneﬁt (accounting for life ex-
pectancy) and the cost of education. Comparing net lifetime incomes, i.e. labor
income and pension beneﬁts net of pension contributions and education costs, an
individual only goes for education if his ability exceeds a certain cutoﬀ level (1−h∗)
which is implicitly given by5









with Ph∗ = b+α(1−h∗)w and Pq from (2). With r as the exogenously given interest
rate, 1
1+rPj (j ∈ {h∗,q}) represents the present value of the pension payment. An
individual of ability h∗ is exactly indiﬀerent between acquiring skills and working as
an unskilled worker. Remember that low values of h indicate high abilities, i.e. only
4This return is equal to the growth rate of the total sum of wages. Without productivity growth
this corresponds to Samuelson’s biological interest rate, i.e. the population growth rate.
5The modeling of agents’ heterogeneity with respect to ability and the formulation of the cutoﬀ
level is inspired by Razin and Sadka (1999).
6individuals with h ≤ h∗ go for education. We assume two kinds of education costs:
direct costs hg, where g is some per unit cost of education, and opportunity costs in
the sense of foregone earnings from unskilled labor supply in period one while going
for education. In what follows we assume
(1 − h
∗) = q (4)
which means that the individual who is indiﬀerent between going for education
or not, earns the same working life labor income whatever education decision he
makes6. Note that we choose g such that (4) holds. From (3) we can infer that h∗g =
1
1+rσ(b+αqw) ensures (1−h∗) to equal q. Furthermore, with the distribution function
F(h), h∗ determines the number of educated workers or rather the educational level
in the economy.
The role of the government in our model is conﬁned to collecting the payroll
income tax and distributing pension beneﬁts. We assume that this governmental
task is costless, i.e. we ignore administrative costs. The budget constraint in a PAYG






















i.e. the aggregate pension beneﬁts of generation −i are ﬁnanced by the contributions
of the currently working generation i. The size of a generation is denoted by N. With
our assumption of a non-growing population, N is the same across all generations.
Since we assume a pension system with a ﬁxed contribution rate t, any change
of the structure of beneﬁts, i.e. higher or lower Beveridgian/Bismarckian beneﬁts,
needs to be compensated within the beneﬁts sphere as total contributions are given.
We use the following Lemma to describe the life-expectancy adjusted relationship
between contributions and beneﬁts in a PAYG pension system in a given period.
Lemma 1 If and only if there is no life-expectancy diﬀerential (σ = 1), the average-
income individual contributes to the pension system exactly the amount necessary
to cover the retirement beneﬁt of a retiree who was an average-income individual
himself.
6This is in line with Razin and Sadka’s (1999) deﬁnition (2).
7This can be seen when we reformulate budget constraint (5) – as shown in Ap-
pendix A – as
t˜ w = b + α ˆ w (6)
or rather





















is the ratio of the aggregate wage income of the currently young generation relative




















is the life expectancy weighted average wage income level of the currently old gen-
eration.7 See that only for σ = 0, i.e. in case of no life expectancy diﬀerential,
˜ w = ˆ w = ¯ w, with ¯ w as the average labor income level and
t¯ w = b + α ¯ w,
i.e. the contribution of an average income individual exactly supplies the retirement
beneﬁt of a retiree who was an average income individual himself. As stated in
Lemma 1 and displayed in equation (6) this equality does no longer hold if retirees
diﬀer in life expectancy.
3 The eﬀects of a pension reform
This section analyzes the eﬀects of a pension reform on the educational level, on
intragenerational redistribution via the pension system and on welfare. As already
7Note that due to our assumption of identical generations, h∗
i = h∗
−i holds in every period,
except for one: the period in which the reform takes place, since then we expect the educational
level to diﬀer between the pre- and the post-reform generation. However, most of the time we can
omit the generation superscript and simply write h∗.
8argued before, our simplifying assumptions regarding reproduction behavior guaran-
tee that individual decision making will not change over time. If a generation decides
on the educational level and, thus, implicitly retirement income, this income – al-
though received in the subsequent period and covered from next period’s workers’
contributions – will be just as expected today.
3.1 Adjustment in the beneﬁts sphere
As already argued, a change of the Bismarckian parameter requires an adjustment of
the ﬂat-rate beneﬁt in a ﬁxed contribution rate system in order to keep the system’s
budget balanced. Let us look at this adjustment in more detail before going for our
‘main’ analysis in the following Sections 3.2 to 3.4. We state the following Lemma.
Lemma 2 In a ﬁxed contribution rate system, a change in the Bismarckian param-
eter α requires an adjustment of the ﬂat-rate beneﬁt b. This adjustment consists of a
direct budget eﬀect and an indirect eﬀect due to the reform’s eﬀect on the economy’s
educational level which has to be considered if there is a life expectancy diﬀerential
between skilled and unskilled individuals.
Remember the relationship between contributions and beneﬁts in the pension
system as captured by (7)
b = t˜ w − α ˆ w.







Deriving ∂ ˜ w
∂h∗ and ∂ ˆ w
























σ(b + αqw), (11)
9where n(h∗) denotes the number of individuals of ability type h∗ and ˜ n the life
expectancy weighted size of a generation. The sign of ∂b
∂h∗ is clearly negative. The
intuition here is as follows: the portion of individuals with a higher life expectancy
is smaller in a generation with a lower educational level; due to our assumption of
life annuity pension beneﬁts and for given contributions, ceteris paribus, this allows
for a higher ﬂat-rate beneﬁt.
The adjustment of the ﬂat-rate beneﬁt b if the Bismarckian factor α changes,
consists of two eﬀects. Using (7) and (10) yields
db
dα



























0 f(h)dh + (1 − σ)
R 1
h∗ f(h)dh
= − ˆ w. (13)

















with the ﬁrst term as the (negative) direct budget eﬀect in a ﬁxed contribution rate
system and the indirect one via the induced change in the educational level. The
sign of the latter is determined by the sign of dh∗
dα which will be shown to be negative
in the following section. Hence, if this indirect eﬀect which is positive (since ∂b
∂h∗ is
also negative) dominates the direct budget eﬀect, the ﬂat-rate beneﬁt might even
also have to increase in case of an increase of the Bismarckian parameter, despite
the assumed ﬁxed contribution rate system. The adjustment in the beneﬁts sphere
in case of a reform as represented by (14) illustrates Lemma 2.
3.2 Level of education
We are interested in the eﬀect of a reform toward a more Bismarckian system (i.e. a
marginal increase of α) on the ability cutoﬀ level h∗ in the education decision. The
pension reform is assumed to be a one-time event. Let us analyze dh∗
dα considering
the public budget constraint.
10Proposition 1 A marginal increase of the Bismarckian parameter α (in a ﬁxed
contribution rate system) reduces the educational level in the economy. This is due
to a positive life expectancy diﬀerential between skilled and unskilled individuals.







































































Zα consists of a positive and a negative component. The ﬁrst one, 1
1+rσqw, cap-
tures the positive eﬀect of an increase in α on the Bismarckian part of an h∗-type
individual’s pension beneﬁt. Due to the positive life expectancy diﬀerential, a skilled
individual beneﬁts more from this eﬀect compared to an unskilled individual. On
the other hand, skilled individuals also lose more from the reduction in the ﬂat-rate
beneﬁt b. The reason is, that due to the higher life expectancy of skilled individuals,
their ﬂat-rate pension beneﬁt is higher in present value terms than for unskilled in-
dividuals. This eﬀect is captured by 1
1+rσ( ∂b
∂α|h∗=const.) The overall sign of (15) can be
shown to be unambiguously negative, meaning that around the ability cutoﬀ level,
less individuals prefer to become educated when α increases.









< 0 ⇔ qw < ˆ w (16)
11which should always hold if there is at least one (educated) higher income individual




unambiguously holds, which implies that the reform reduces the educational level in
the economy. This proves Proposition 1.
Although we do not model other generations explicitly, the eﬀects on those can
easily be derived. Note ﬁrst that any generation following the generation of workers
who are aﬀected by the one-time pension reform will perfectly replicate this ‘initial’
generation, i.e. it will not change its educational decisions. Hence, there is only one
generation left which may be aﬀected by the reform: the retirees in the period of the
reform. In Section 3.4 dealing with welfare eﬀects we will come back to this.
3.3 Redistribution
The previous section took a view from a broader (‘macro’) perspective, arguing that
a pension reform toward a higher Bismarckian factor reduces educational eﬀort in the
economy. However, a pension reform not only changes the level of education in our
model economy but also the redistributive characteristics of the pension system. A
priori it is not clear how the reform aﬀects diﬀerent (skill) groups in society such that
– at the end of the day – h∗ falls. It may turn out that a pension reform which leads
to a lower educational level and should therefore be undesired by the population as
a whole becomes attractive for an increasing subgroup of citizens because they gain
from redistribution via the pension system.
In order to analyze the distributional eﬀects, we look at the individual who repre-
sents the transition from net-recipients to net-payers in the system. We are interested
in seeing whether individuals who were indiﬀerent in terms of redistribution before
the reform will gain or lose from the reform. Only in the next section we will turn
to a more thorough welfare analysis.
Net-recipients in our model are individuals whose pension beneﬁts (in present
value terms and considering life expectancy) exceed their contributions. Since all
uneducated individuals are equal with respect to labor income and life expectancy,
8Remember that qw is the lowest possible labor income in the economy.
12they are either all net-recipients or net-payers. The latter case (from which we will
abstain in what follows) can occur if the life expectancy diﬀerential is such that
the poor-to-rich redistributional eﬀect of the pension system exceeds the rich-to-
poor redistributional eﬀect. Within the group of educated individuals there might
be net-recipients and net-payers.
We now analyze the eﬀect of a reform on the ability level ˜ h characterizing the
individual at the transition between net-recipients and net-payers. The implicit def-
inition of ˜ h is given by




b + α(1 − ˜ h)w

= 0. (17)
The present value of pension beneﬁts for an ˜ h-type individual exactly equals his
pension contributions. Individuals with abilities greater than the threshold ability,
i.e. individuals with h < ˜ h, are net-payers while all other individuals with lower
abilities are net-recipients.
Let us ﬁrst of all check for the existence and uniqueness of ˜ h.
Lemma 3 A contribution rate t > 1
1+rα ensures the existence of an ability level
˜ h < h∗, which is unique.
This result follows from Figure 2, presenting the individual tax bills or rather
pension contributions and the individual retirement beneﬁts for the diﬀerent ability
types. It illustrates the deﬁnition of ˜ h for a given pension system with α,b > 0. With
the distribution function F(h), ˜ h determines the size of the group of net-recipients
or rather net-payers in the system.
The tax bill curve in Figure 2 being steeper than the retirement beneﬁts curve
(for skilled individuals, i.e. to the right of (1−h∗)) ensures the tax bill and retirement





is a suﬃcient condition for ˜ h to exist.
The fact that both the tax bill and the retirement beneﬁts curve are linear (and
therefore intersect only once) and the governmental budget constraint ensure that
˜ h is unique and ˜ h < 0 (i.e. there are net-payers in the pension system). This proves
Lemma 3.
13Figure 2: Ability cutoﬀ level h∗ and threshold ˜ h
After having checked for the existence and uniqueness of ˜ h we can now turn to
comparative statics and analyze the eﬀect of a policy change on ˜ h 6= h∗. Again, we
consider a policy change toward a more Bismarckian system, i.e. a marginal increase
of α.
Proposition 2 A marginal increase of the Bismarckian factor increases the number
of net-recipients relative to net-payers in the pension system if and only if the ﬂat-
rate beneﬁt either also increases or if at least a potential reduction does not exceed
the increase of an ˜ h-type individual’s Bismarckian beneﬁt due to the reform.
Hence, whether the number of net-recipients relative to the number of net-payers in
the pension system increases or decreases as a consequence of the reform is a priori































14Condition (18) ensures that B < 0. Therefore, the sign of d˜ h
dα solely depends on the






≤ 0, (1 − ˜ h)w + db
dα ≥ 0
> 0, (1 − ˜ h)w + db
dα < 0.
(22)
As long as the adjustment of the ﬂat-rate beneﬁt due to the increased Bismarckian
factor is positive, i.e. db
dα > 0, or at least no too large in case it is negative, ˜ h
decreases (i.e. the ability threshold (1 − ˜ h) in Figure 2 shifts to the right) implying
an increasing number of net-recipients relative to net-payers in the pension system.
The individual whose pension beneﬁts (in present value terms) exactly equal his
contributions would now become a net-recipient if the reform was implemented.
Lemma 2, i.e. the fact that the adjustment of the ﬂat-rate beneﬁt does not only
consist of a direct (negative) budget eﬀect but also of an indirect (positive) eﬀect
due the change in the educational level and therefore the average life expectancy of
retirees – which might even induce an increase in b – explains this result.
3.4 Welfare eﬀects
Beside an analysis of a pension reform’s eﬀect on the redistributive characteristics
of the system as presented above, a further important step in evaluating the reform
is to ask about welfare implications. Who gains and who loses from the reform and
does the economy or rather society as a whole gain or lose?
3.4.1 Individual welfare
After making the education decision according to indiﬀerence condition (3), the
individual optimization problem is to maximize lifetime utility U from consumption









(1 − t)qw +
1
1 + r
(1 − σ)(b + αqw) − c
q






9The value of consumption in both periods (we assume goods prices to be normalized to one)
does not exceed the present value of net income from labor supply and the pension system. Skilled
individuals also consider education expenditures in addition to the value of goods consumption.





















for skilled individuals with h ≤ h∗. η is the Lagrangian multiplier.




j(w,t,r,α,b,σ) for unskilled and ch
j =
ch
j(w,t,r,α,b,h,g) for skilled individuals, where j ∈ {1,2} and h ∈ [0,h∗].
The corresponding indirect utility functions are vq = vq(w,t,r,α,b,σ) and vh =
vh(w,t,r,α,b,h,g).
Proposition 3 The individuals of the post-reform generations only gain from the
reform if either the ﬂat-rate beneﬁt increases or if at least a potential reduction does
not exceed the increase of their Bismarckian beneﬁt due to the reform.































Whether an individual gains or loses depends on the direction and the size of the
change in the ﬂat-rate beneﬁt as a consequence of the reform. If the ﬂat-rate beneﬁt
b increases, or if at least a potential reduction of the ﬂat-rate beneﬁt does not exceed
the increase in the Bismarckian component of an unskilled individual, both skilled
and unskilled individuals unambiguously gain from the reform. However, beyond
this threshold, only those (skilled) individuals with a high enough labor income, i.e.
those who gain more from the higher Bismarckian beneﬁt than they lose from the
reduction in the ﬂat-rate, gain from the reform.
Hence, knowing the size of the adjustment of the ﬂat-rate beneﬁt b not only allows
us to determine the group of individuals who beneﬁt from the reform, but by means
of the ability distribution F(h) we could also analyze the size of ‘interest groups’ in
favor or against the reform. Furthermore, (22) then provides additional information
on its redistributive consequences. Both aspects would be of special interest in a
political economy framework analyzing the political support for the reform.
16So far, we ignored the retirees in the period of the reform (generation −i) whose
beneﬁts depend on their own contributions but, in a PAYG system, also on the
contributions of the subsequent generation (i) which now has a lower educational
level due to the reform. Let us analyze the change in the pension beneﬁts of these
post-reform retirees, assuming that the new Bismarckian factor also applies to their
pension scheme.
Proposition 4 While the unskilled retirees in the period of the reform unambigu-
ously lose from the reform, skilled retirees only gain if they have an above average
labor income. Only in case of a right of continuance with respect to the Bismarckian
factor, the retirees’ welfare is not aﬀected by the reform.



























− ˆ w−i + qw−i
= − ˆ w−i + qw−i < 0, (25)
where n(h∗) denotes the number of individuals with an ability level h∗ and ˜ n the
life expectancy weighted size of a generation. The unskilled retirees clearly lose from
the reform. Whether a skilled retiree gains or loses depends on whether his labor




t˜ wi,−i − α ˆ w−i + α(1 − h−i)w−i

= − ˆ w−i + (1 − h−i)w−i. (26)
Only if there exists a right of continuance with respect to the Bismarckian parameter


















Assumption (4) which ensures the aggregate wage income and therefore the sum of
contributions to remain constant (at the margin), drives this result.
3.4.2 Social welfare
Whether the ‘society’ as a whole gains or loses from the reform is not a priori obvious.
We now analyze the overall welfare change of skilled and unskilled individuals of
17a generation i by means of two exemplary social welfare functions. We assume the
before mentioned right of continuance and therefore ignore the generation −i retirees.

















≤ 0, qw + db
dα ≤ 0
> 0, qw + db
dα > 0.
(28)
The reform unambiguously reduces social welfare described by a Rawlsian welfare
function if the individuals with the lowest utility level, i.e. the unskilled individuals,
lose from the reform.


































































Assuming identical welfare weights for all individuals and vh∗ = vq (which holds
for example in a setting with Uq = uq(c
q











1) for j ∈ {q,h}) the ﬁrst term of (31) vanishes and the overall sign of
dWU
dα , i.e. the direction of the welfare change due to the pension reform, depends on
the size and direction of the adjustment of the ﬂat-rate beneﬁt relative to the change
in the individual Bismarckian beneﬁts, on the educational level in the economy and
the distribution of abilities among individuals.10 A priori, it is by no means clear
10In this very limited partial equilibrium welfare analysis we ignored potential eﬀects of a change
in the educational level on wages or on macroeconomic variables such as for example economic
growth.
18that the beneﬁciaries’ gains from the reform would suﬃce to compensate potential
losses. On the other hand, however, with an increase in the ﬂat-rate beneﬁt, i.e.
db
dα > 0, or at least a reduction which is not too large, a marginal reform could also
be Pareto-improving.
4 Conclusion
In many countries, pension reforms since the 1990s aimed at a reduction of intragen-
erational redistribution by strengthening the link between individual contributions
and beneﬁts. Usually, these reforms are slowly phased in and still need to be fully
anticipated by the population. Our results show that it is not clear whether the
reforms will be successful in the long run. While we expect that a reduction of work
disincentives from (distortive) redistributive taxation will be welfare-enhancing, the
reduction of educational eﬀort due to a pension reform could dilute economic growth.
In an aging society, however, growth is the key to stabilizing social security systems.
Policy-makers should keep these possible eﬀects in mind. The life expectancy dif-
ferential between skilled and unskilled individuals, for which there is empirical evi-
dence, causes the education disincentive eﬀect. Furthermore we demonstrated that,
in a ﬁxed contribution rate system, the reform requires an adjustment of the ﬂat-rate
beneﬁt consisting not only of a direct budget eﬀect but also an indirect one due to
the decreased educational level. The direction and the size of this adjustment is the
key to the reform’s eﬀect on the (intragenerational) redistributive characteristics as
well as on welfare.
To our knowledge especially the possibility of a (higher) education discouraging
eﬀect of a pension reform reducing the progression of the system as well as the
redistributive consequences of the reform in the sense of a change in the number
of net-payers and net-recipients has been ignored in the literature and the policy
discussion so far.
Note that our assumption of a ﬁxed contribution rate regime is not entirely
innocuous in the context of our results and that there exist only few public pension
systems which are considered to be of the DC (deﬁned contributions) type.11 If we
11‘DC system’ is the more commonly used term for what technically has to be interpreted as a
pension system with ﬁxed contribution rates.
19assumed the more common DB (deﬁned beneﬁts) or ﬁxed pension beneﬁts system, it
would easily be possible to raise α without lowering the ﬂat-rate beneﬁt b. Obviously,
this leads to higher total spending and requires higher contributions to keep the
budget balanced. In the real world, this additional tax burden may be shifted to
younger cohorts or yet unborn generations.12 However, although several countries
are still considered to have DB systems, many of them have started to introduce
policy measures to keep contribution rates constant in the long run. The reason is
that, due to demographic change, contribution rates would increase substantially in
the future, inducing strong work disincentives for the young. With increasing factor
mobility in a globalized world, hardly any country can aﬀord this development. It
is therefore justiﬁed to argue based on a ﬁxed contribution rate pension system.
We saw that various economic parameters determine the consequences of a pen-
sion reform, like the one analyzed above, with respect to educational level, intragen-
erational redistribution and welfare. The life expectancy diﬀerential between skilled
and unskilled individuals, the distribution of abilities or rather productivities among
individuals and the return to education in terms of labor income were shown to play
a role here. Therefore, one and the same reform of a pension system’s beneﬁts scheme
in diﬀerent countries may have completely diﬀerent consequences, depending on pa-
rameter diﬀerentials. This insight might serve as a starting point for an empirical
testing of our Propositions 1 and 2.
Finally, we want to note that our results are not only relevant for countries with
a mainly Beveridgian pension system thinking about relating beneﬁts more closely
to individual contributions. Take the German system which is of the Bismarckian
type as an example. By gradually reducing the individual recognition of time spent
on (higher) education in the German pension beneﬁts scheme since the 1990s and
ﬁnally abolishing it in 2005, the system eﬀectively became even more Bismarckian or
rather less progressive with respect to intragenerational redistribution. On the one
hand this should remove work disincentives. On the other hand, due to increased
indirect (opportunity) costs of education, we would expect these measures to have
an additional disincentive eﬀect on education beside the one we examined in this
paper. This tradeoﬀ represents a very interesting opportunity for further theoretical
as well as empirical research.
12The seminal contribution in this context is Browning (1975); see also Haupt and Peters (1998)
or Krieger (2003) for further discussion.
20Appendix
A The public budget constraint

































































Dividing both sides of the budget constraint (5) by z then yields
t˜ w = b + α ˆ w.
B The sign of Zα






























(1 − h)f(h)dh. (32)
This inequality strictly holds if h∗ > 0, i.e. if there is at least one individual with
some ability h who prefers education to remaining unskilled, since (1 − h∗) = q.
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